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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Defendants have long objected to the imposition of punitive damages 
in mass tort litigation, contending that such damages sanction defendants 
repeatedly for the same culpable conduct.  Courts generally have rejected 
these contentions.  Courts have concluded, at least in part, that even if 
multiple punitive damage awards in mass tort litigation sanction a 
defendant for the same culpable conduct, no single award of punitive 
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damages punishes a defendant for the entire scope of its misconduct.1  In 
other words, no single award represents total harm damages.2  In so 
doing, however, courts fail to examine closely the process by which 
punitive damage decisionmakers are asked to determine punitive damage 
awards.3 
As Professor Schwartz noted in a commentary on punitive damages in 
mass tort litigation almost ten years ago, “the jury often determines [the 
amount of punitive damages] by assessing the wrongfulness of the 
defendant’s overall conduct, including its capacity to cause many 
injuries.”4  While almost all states purport to limit punitive damages to 
the harm to the injured plaintiff before the court, most states allow 
decisionmakers to increase a punitive damage award based on the 
“reprehensibility” of the defendant’s conduct.5  This reprehensibility 
factor has been used as an opportunity to present to the decisionmakers 
evidence of conduct directed at parties not before the court and the harm 
that conduct caused to the absent parties.  Particularly, the reprehensibility 
factor has been used to allow the decisionmakers to consider the total 
number of victims from defendant’s tortious conduct in setting a 
punitive award and to increase the amount of a punitive damage award 
based solely on the number of victims.  As such, the reprehensibility 
factor has been used as a vehicle to invite the decisionmakers to punish 
the defendant not just for the harm caused to the injured plaintiff before 
the court but also for the harm caused to all victims of the defendant’s 
tortious activity.  In other words, reprehensibility evidence has been used 
to allow the punitive damage decisionmakers to impose total harm 
damages.  Thus, contrary to the courts’ characterization, multiple punitive 
damage awards do expose the defendant to the potential for repeated 
sanctions for the same misconduct in mass tort litigation. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1384, 1389 (3rd Cir. 1993) (noting that 
the punitive damage award was intended to represent punishment for the conduct 
directed at the injured plaintiff before the court only). 
 2. Commentator Thomas Colby describes the practice of awarding, in a single 
case to a single victim, punitive damages to punish the defendant “for the full scope of 
societal harm caused by its entire course of wrongful conduct” as the practice of 
awarding “‘total harm’ punitive damages.”  Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple 
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 587 (2003).  I adopt his terminology in this Article. 
 3. Punitive damages usually are awarded in a three-step process.  Initially, the 
trier of fact (usually a jury) determines liability for and the amount of punitive damages.  
The trial court and an appellate court then review the award, and either court may remit 
the award if that court concludes that the award is excessive.  I use the term “punitive 
damage decisionmakers” to refer to the trier of fact and both reviewing courts. 
 4. Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and Punitive Damages: A Comment, 39 VILL. L. 
REV. 415, 430 (1994). 
 5. See infra note 16. 
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As commentator Thomas Colby recognized, literature on punitive 
damages only rarely has discussed this practice of awarding total harm 
damages,6 and the practice has gone largely unaddressed by lower 
courts.  However, the practice raises potential questions about the 
viability of multiple punitive damage awards in mass tort litigation.7  In 
this Article, I will discuss how the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
State Farm v. Campbell8 reformed the reprehensibility analysis and how 
this reformation may have the perhaps unintended consequence of 
eliminating the practice of awarding total harm damages.  In particular, 
in an effort to limit the size of individual punitive damage awards, 
Campbell limits the use of evidence of conduct directed at parties not 
before the court.  Campbell prohibits an increase in reprehensibility 
based solely on the large number of other acts or the large volume of 
harm from those acts.  Rather, reprehensibility may be increased based 
on the presence of other acts only if those other acts demonstrate the 
defendant’s knowledge of the consequences of its acts directed at the 
plaintiff, the deliberateness of the defendant’s conduct directed at the 
plaintiff or the defendant’s bad faith in dealing with the plaintiff.  In so 
limiting the role of other act evidence, Campbell limits the potential for 
total harm punitive damages in mass tort litigation.  At the same time, 
Campbell reforms reprehensibility into an analysis that better comports 
 
 6. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 2, at 662; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 430–31.  
Instead, some commentators start from the assumption that multiple punitive damage 
awards punish a defendant for the same culpable conduct, then propose reforms to limit 
the impact of duplicative awards.  See, e.g., David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages 
Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 411 (1994).  Other 
commentators, like courts, maintain that each award punishes the defendant for a 
separate transaction, and hence, different culpable conduct.  However, also like courts, 
these commentators do not consider the information given to decisionmakers to calculate 
awards.  See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive Damage Awards, 39 VILL. L. REV. 
433, 443–44 (1994). 
 7. Commentators have noted that multiple sanctions for the same misconduct 
raise potential constitutional concerns.  See, e.g., Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive 
Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429, 1434 (2004) (outlining 
several due process objections to awarding punitive damages based on injuries to absent 
parties); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 430–31 (arguing that the inability to join all claims in 
a single forum allows for “normatively inappropriate multiple punishments”); John 
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 139, 140 (1986) (“[U]nrestrained punitive liability for a single course of conduct 
[is] arguably unconstitutional.”).  Likewise, awarding total harm damages raises 
questions about a single court’s jurisdiction to award total harm damages as well as 
choice of law concerns. 
 8. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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with the traditional retributivist principles of criminal punishment put 
forth as a justification for considering reprehensibility in the first 
instance. 
II.  THE DEBATE OVER MULTIPLE PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A.  Objections to Multiple Punitive Damage Awards 
Opponents of multiple punitive damage awards have objected on two 
related grounds.  First, opponents contend that multiple punitive damage 
awards punish a defendant for the same conduct or course of conduct 
and that punishing a defendant multiple times for the same course of 
conduct is fundamentally unfair.9  For example, opponents would argue 
that in cases such as BMW v. Gore,10 awarding punitive damages to 
every person who purchased a repaired or repainted automobile would 
punish BMW for the same culpable conduct—the corporate decision by 
BMW to sell cars without disclosing repairs which amounted to less than 
3% of the total value. 
Second, opponents argue that due process places some limit on the 
total amount of punitive damages a defendant can be forced to pay for a 
single act or course of conduct.  While any individual punitive damage 
award or even a series of multiple awards would not exceed this 
substantive limit, opponents reason that at some point the aggregate 
value of multiple punitive damage awards exceeds this limit and results 
in “overkill.”11  For example, in a recent asbestos case, Owens Corning 
estimated that juries in twenty-eight cases filed across the country had 
awarded more than $51 million in punitive damages to plaintiffs in 
 
 9. Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1096 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(discussing an asbestos defendant’s argument that repeated punitive damage awards in 
asbestos exposure cases rely on the same culpable conduct, thus punishing the same 
wrongdoing, and that due process limited the number of times a corporation could be 
made to pay sanctions for the same culpable act); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 
187, 215 (Colo. 1984) (noting an argument by a pharmaceutical manufacturer that the 
potential for multiple punitive damage awards involving the same conduct offended 
fundamental fairness); see also Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 
1042 (5th Cir. 1984) (involving an asbestos manufacturer who argued that multiple penalties 
violate double jeopardy). 
 10. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 11. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1384, 1402 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J. 
dissenting); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, 
J. dissenting): 
[T]here is surely some limit imposed by law on the amount for which 
[defendants] can be held liable for a single wrongful act or course of conduct.  
Unlimited multiple punishment for the same act determined in a succession of 
individual lawsuits and bearing no relation to the defendants’ culpability or the 
actual injuries suffered by victims, would violate the sense of “fundamental 
fairness” that is essential to constitutional due process. 
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lawsuits against Owens Corning arising out of the manufacturer and sale 
of asbestos-containing insulation.  Owens Corning argued that the cumulative 
size of multiple punitive damage awards grossly exceeded the legitimate 
ends of punishment and deterrence.12  Implicit in this argument is the 
same assumption which underlies the first objection—that multiple 
punitive damages repeatedly impose sanctions for the same misconduct.13 
B.  Judicial Responses 
While courts have acknowledged concern over multiple punitive 
damage awards, courts generally have rejected defendants’ challenges.  
Many of these courts have concluded that even if multiple punitive 
damage awards sanction a defendant for the same culpable conduct, no 
single award sanctions the defendant for the entire scope of that 
misconduct.  Instead, these courts reason that each award punishes the 
defendant for its conduct only to the extent that it harmed the injured 
plaintiff before the court.  Thus, for example, in cases such as Gore,14 
these courts would conclude that awarding punitive damages to each 
consumer who purchased a repainted car might punish BMW for the 
same culpable conduct—the corporate decision to sell cars without 
disclosing repairs which were made for less than 3% of the car’s retail 
value—but that no single award to a purchaser would punish BMW for 
the entire scope of the decision.  Instead, each award would punish 
BMW only to the extent that BMW’s corporate policy harmed the 
injured plaintiff before the court.  Consequently, these courts reason that 
multiple awards are not duplicative.15 
 
 12. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex. 
1998).  Owens-Corning conceded that it had paid only approximately $3 million in 
punitive damage awards.  Id. 
 13. See Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(noting that both the overkill argument and the repetitive sanction argument rely on the 
premise that the wrongful conduct sought to be punished in a subsequent suit is the same 
conduct that was previously punished). 
 14. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559. 
 15. See, e.g., Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1384 (noting that because the district court expressly 
referred to the amount of compensatory damages in calculating a remitted punitive 
award, the remitted award was intended to represent punishment for conduct directed at 
the plaintiff only); King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir. 
1990) (“On this record this Court cannot hold that Celotex has been punished repetitively 
and so excessively ‘as to shock the sense of mankind’ in violation of the Texas 
Constitution.  Here the jury’s award of punitive damages was specifically targeted to 
Celotex’s conduct as it affected each plaintiff.”); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 
F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.N.J. 1989), modifying 705 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989); Owens-
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III.  VEHICLES FOR IMPOSING TOTAL HARM DAMAGES 
A.  Reprehensibility as a Vehicle for Imposing Total Harm Damages 
As Professor Schwartz recognized, current procedures for awarding 
punitive damages invite the punitive damage decisionmakers to consider 
the entire scope of a defendant’s misconduct, including transactions with 
other consumers and, consequently, the harm to those other consumers.  
Most states instruct the trier of fact (usually the jury) to consider certain 
factors in deciding initially whether to award punitive damages and in 
what amount.  Some of these factors invite the trier of fact and reviewing 
courts to consider the entire scope of a defendant’s misconduct, 
including conduct the defendant directed at parties other than the injured 
party before the court.  For example, some states require the trier of fact 
to consider the “reprehensibility” of the defendant’s misconduct in 
determining the size of any punitive award.16  These states, in turn, 
 
Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ky. 1998); Eagle-Picher 
Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 472 (Md. 1992) (rejecting the defendants’ due 
process challenge because the defendants failed to show that the factfinder, making a 
previous award, understood its award to be punishment for the full extent of the 
defendants’ misconduct rather than punishment for the injuries to the particular plaintiff 
before that court); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 591 A.2d 544, 557–58 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1991) (holding that punitive damages were awarded solely for the harm inflicted 
upon a specific plaintiff rather than for the totality of the harm), rev’d on other grounds, 
604 A.2d 47 (Md. 1992). 
 16. At least thirteen states expressly instruct the trier of fact to consider the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct.  See, e.g., Arizona: Hawkins v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987) (“[A] category of relevant evidence [for the 
fact finder to consider in determining a reasonable punitive damage award] is the nature 
of the defendant’s conduct, including the reprehensibility of the conduct.”); California: 
California Jury Instructions, Civil 14.71 (2004) (“In arriving at any award of punitive 
damages, consider the following factors: (1) the reprehensibility of the conduct of the 
defendant. . . .”); Illinois: Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 576 N.E.2d 1146, 1168 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1991) (“The reprehensibility of . . . misconduct and the need to deter it are primary 
factors in determining the appropriate level of punitive damages.”).  Other states instruct 
the trier of fact to consider similar factors like the nature of the defendant’s conduct.  
See, e.g., Florida: Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, PD–1 6 (2004) 
(instructing the jury to consider “the nature, extent and degree of misconduct”); 
Georgia: Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 386 S.E.2d 120, 124 n.13 (Ga. 1989) (stating that in 
awarding punitive damages, the fact finder may consider “the nature and egregiousness 
of the defendant’s conduct”), vacated, 499 U.S. 914 (1991), aff’d, 409 S.E.2d 501 
(1991); Iowa: Iowa Civil Jury Instruction No. 210.1 (1987) (instructing the jury to 
consider the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence, the 
necessity of preventing similar wrong and “the nature of the defendant’s conduct,” or the 
defendant’s culpability); see also Alabama: S. Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586 
So. 2d 854, 857 (Ala. 1991) (stating that to determine the appropriate measure of 
punitive damages, the fact finder must consider the “culpability of the wrongdoer”); 
Colorado: Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. 1980) (“[I]n determining 
the amount which should be awarded as punitive damages, the severity of the 
defendant’s wrong . . . must be considered to ensure that the award will punish the 
defendant.”); Wisconsin: Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (Wis. 1980) 
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measure reprehensibility based on the entire scope of the defendant’s 
misconduct, including transactions with other parties and the number of 
actual or potential victims of the defendant’s misconduct.  This allows 
the jury to increase its assessment of reprehensibility, and, hence, the 
amount of punitive damages, based on the existence of multiple 
transactions and multiple victims.17  Other states delineate the scope of 
the defendant’s misconduct or the duration of the misconduct as a factor 
for the decisionmaker to consider in and of itself.18  The states then 
define the scope of the misconduct as the number of actual or potential 
victims.  Thus, these states allow the decisionmaker to consider transactions 
other than the transaction with the injured plaintiff before the court.19  
 
(“Factors to be considered in determining the proper amount to be awarded as punitive 
damages include: the grievousness of the defendant’s acts.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Fernandez v. N. Shore Orthopedic Surgery & Sports Med., 79 F. 
Supp. 2d 197, 207–08 & n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the existence of repeated 
instances of misconduct was an aggravating factor supporting increased reprehensibility 
and that repeated misconduct included misconduct directed toward parties other than the 
plaintiff); Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1557–58. (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“In considering 
the nature, extent, and enormity of the wrong and all of the surrounding circumstances, 
courts have regularly considered acts other than the acts giving rise to the defendant’s 
liability to the plaintiff on the issue of punitive damages.”) (applying Florida law); 
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1148 (Utah 2001) (noting 
that the defendant “repeatedly and deliberately deceived and cheated its customers”—for 
over two decades it “systematically harassed and intimidated opposing claimants, 
witnesses, and attorneys” and “engaged in a pattern of trickery and deceit, false 
statements, and other acts of affirmative misconduct”—in finding that the defendant’s 
conduct was “malicious, reprehensible, and wrong”) (internal quotations omitted), rev’d, 
538 U.S. 408 (2003); Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 608, 614 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1998) (holding that evidence of the defendant’s interference with prior contracts 
was improperly excluded because such evidence demonstrated the character of the 
defendant’s conduct and the degree of the defendant’s culpability), rev’d on other 
grounds, 52 S.W.3d 711, 729 (Tex. 2001); see also Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d 
267, 285–86 (Md. 1998) (stating that lack of evidence that the defendant engaged in 
similar misconduct directed at other employees was a basis for reducing the punitive 
damage award). 
 18. See, e.g., Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.020(c)(4) (Michie 2002) (stating that in 
determining the amount of punitive damages, “the fact finder may consider . . . the 
duration of the conduct and any intentional concealment of the conduct”); Kansas: KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b)(4) (1994) (stating that in determining the amount of punitive 
damages, “the court may consider . . . the duration of the misconduct and any intentional 
concealment of it”); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15–5.12(b)(4) (West 2000) 
(stating that in determining the amount of punitive damages, the trier of fact considers 
“the duration of the misconduct and any concealment”). 
 19. See, e.g., O’Gilvie v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that the “number of consumers whose safety was potentially impacted by [the 
defendant’s] conduct with respect to [the product at issue]” supported an increased 
punitive damage award), aff’d, 519 U.S. 79 (1996); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
JANUTIS.DOC 8/21/2019  11:51 AM 
 
1472 
Consideration of such evidence may result in a trier of fact imposing 
sanctions to punish and deter the entire scope of conduct.  Indeed, in 
some instances, plaintiff’s counsel has invited the trier of fact to impose 
punitive damages to punish the entire scope of the defendant’s misconduct, 
including the defendant’s transactions with people other than the injured 
parties before the court.20 
All states provide for some judicial review of the punitive damage 
award.21  However, like the trier of fact, the trial court and appellate 
court are instructed to consider the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
misconduct in reviewing a fact finder’s punitive award22 or the duration 
 
Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262–63 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that RJR “acted intentionally to 
mislead the public” and that but for its misconduct “[f]ewer Kansas residents, thus, 
would have suffered” in finding that RJR’s conduct was “extremely reprehensible”). 
 20. See Colby, supra note 2, at 584–85 & nn.3–4 (citing instances in which 
plaintiff’s counsel argued to the jury that a defendant should be punished for the entire 
scope of its misconduct and instances in which jurors reported setting awards based on 
the entire scope of a defendant’s misconduct); see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray, 
The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue of Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 78 
OR. L. REV. 275, 313 (1999) (noting that the distinction between punishing a defendant 
directly for other transactions and using evidence of other transactions to help evaluate 
the defendant’s blameworthiness “is a fine one” and opining that juries may not be able 
to understand and apply it); Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death Is Different,” Is Money 
Different?  Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages—Shifting Constitutional 
Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217, 271 (2003) 
(noting that “it is not exactly clear whether there is a real difference” between 
considering conduct as a measure of reprehensibility and punishing that conduct). 
 21. The Supreme Court has indicated that due process requires judicial review of 
punitive damage awards.  See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1994). 
 22. At least twenty states expressly delineate the reprehensibility of the defendant 
as a factor to consider in reviewing the size of a jury award.  See, e.g., California: 
Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 533 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that in determining whether the size of an award “substantially serves the public 
interest in punishment and deterrence,” a reviewing court should consider “the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misdeeds”); Oregon: Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 
17 P.3d 473, 484 (Or. 2001) (stating that in determining the monetary range that a 
rational juror would be entitled to award, a reviewing court should consider “the degree 
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct”).  Other states direct reviewing courts to 
consider similar factors such as the culpability of the defendant.  See, e.g., South 
Carolina: Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354–55 (S.C. 1991) (holding that in 
reviewing the excessiveness of a punitive damage award, a court considers: “(1) 
defendant’s degree of culpability; (2) duration of the conduct; . . . (4) the existence of 
similar past conduct”); Nevada: Ace Truck & Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn, 746 P.2d 
132, 137 (Nev. 1987) (stating that in determining whether a punitive damage award is 
excessive, a court will consider the “culpability and blameworthiness of the tortfeasor”).  
Some states direct reviewing courts to consider the nature or egregiousness of the 
misconduct.  See, e.g., New Mexico: Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission 
Coop., Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 669–72 (N.M. 2002) (directing reviewing courts to consider 
“the enormity and nature of the wrong”); Oklahoma: Scribner v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 
866 P.2d 437, 443 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (“[C]onsideration of the reasonableness of [a 
punitive damage] award [should be compared] in relation to . . . the nature and 
egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct.”); see also Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 549.20 (West 2000) (“The court shall specifically review the punitive damages award 
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or scope of the misconduct.23  Indeed, in BMW v. Gore, the Supreme 
Court recognized reprehensibility as “the most important indicium of the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award.” 24  As a recent case illustrates, 
reviewing courts, like juries, often consider the number of actual victims 
of the defendants’ misconduct as a measure of reprehensibility.  In 
Boeken v. Philip Morris, a Los Angeles jury imposed a $3 billion 
punitive damage award on Philip Morris in a case brought by a single 
lifelong smoker.25  The plaintiff in Boeken alleged that Philip Morris had 
misrepresented the dangers of smoking and that Philip Morris had sold a 
defective product.  Ultimately, the trial court remitted the punitive award.  
However, even after remittitur, the court awarded the plaintiff $100 
million in punitive damages.26  In explaining the substantial size of the 
remitted award, the court noted that the conduct of Philip Morris was 
“utterly reprehensible.”27  The court concluded that Philip Morris’s conduct 
was reprehensible, in part, because Philip Morris engaged in “a 
nationwide pattern of deceit involving millions of American consumers.”28 
B.  Other Vehicles for Imposing Total Harm Damages 
Other factors guiding jury and reviewing court discretion also invite 
 
in light of the [following] factors: . . . the seriousness of hazard to the public arising from 
the defendant’s misconduct [and] the duration of the misconduct . . . .”). 
 23. See, e.g., Arizona: Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston &  Strawn, 
907 P.2d 506, 520 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]his court examines allegedly excessive 
punitive damage awards applying [the following] criteria . . . the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, including the duration of the misconduct . . . .”); New Jersey: 
Lockley v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 828 A.2d 869, 878–79 (N.J. 2003) (reviewing courts 
consider the factors used by the trier of fact to determine the award, including the 
duration of the misconduct). 
 24. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 25. Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., No. BC 226593, 2001 WL 1894403, at *1 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001). 
 26. Id. at *7. 
 27. Id. at *5. 
 28. Id. at *3.  State Farm v. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), the case 
reversed by the Supreme Court, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), provides another example.  The 
Utah Supreme Court used the number of victims nationwide as a basis to reinstate a jury 
punitive damage verdict after a lower court had remitted the verdict.  See id. at 1148 
(noting that “State Farm repeatedly and deliberately deceived and cheated its customers 
via the PP & R scheme”); id. at 1150 (“Because State Farm’s actions have such 
potentially widespread effects, this factor supports a high punitive damage award.”); id. 
at 1151 (noting that State Farm’s willful and fraudulent conduct to Campbell and other 
similarly situated Utah residents supported a larger ration of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages). 
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punitive damage decisionmakers to determine the amount of punitive 
damages with reference to the entire scope of a defendant’s misconduct 
and, hence, to punish the entire scope of the misconduct.  For example, 
many states instruct decisionmakers to consider the profitability of the 
defendant’s conduct.29  These states frequently allow the decisionmaker 
to consider the profit the defendant earned on the entire scope of the 
misconduct30 or the defendant’s total financial condition.31  Such guidance 
 
 29. At least fifteen states direct the trier of fact to consider profitability.  See, e.g., 
Arizona: Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987) (stating that the 
fact finder may consider several factors, including “the profitability of the defendant’s 
conduct”); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b)(3) (1994) (“[T]he court may 
consider: . . . the profitability of the defendant’s misconduct.”); North Dakota: N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(5)(c)(2) (1996): 
[T]he finder of fact shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the 
amount of exemplary damages awarded is consistent with the following 
principles and factors: 
   . . . . 
   . . . The profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the 
desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also sustain a 
loss . . . . 
At least five states direct a reviewing court to consider the profitability of the 
defendant’s misconduct.  See, e.g., Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West 2000) 
(“The court shall specifically review the punitive damages award in light of the 
[following] factors: . . . the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant . . . .”); 
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(c) (2003) (“The judge shall review a jury 
award of punitive damages, giving consideration to each of the [following] matters: . . . 
the profitability of the defendant’s wrongdoing . . . . ”); Tennessee: Hodges v. S.C. Toof 
& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901–02 (Tenn. 1992): 
After a jury has made an award of punitive damages, the trial judge shall 
review the award, giving consideration to all matters on which the jury is 
required to be instructed [including] . . . [w]hether defendant profited from the 
activity, and if the defendant did profit, whether the punitive award should be 
in excess of the profit in order to deter similar future behavior.   
Several other states direct a reviewing court to consider the defendant’s “financial 
condition” or “wealth.”  See, e.g., Arkansas: Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346, 
358 (Ark. 2003) (stating that when reviewing a punitive damage award, a court should 
consider “the financial and social condition and standing of the erring party”), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 535 (2003); Illinois: Hazelwood v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 
1199, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that factors that the reviewing court should 
consider include “the financial status of the defendant”); Pennsylvania: Sprague v. 
Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 927 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (stating that in reviewing a punitive 
damage award, the trial court shall consider “the wealth of the defendant”). 
 30. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054, 1061–62 (Ala. 
1992) (noting that GM sold approximately 600,000 vehicles and sustaining the punitive 
damage award against GM, in part, because even after paying the $15 million award, the 
profit GM made on the total sales of the vehicle at issue would be greater than the profit 
GM would have made had it replaced the allegedly defective part). 
 31. Several states instruct the trier of fact to consider the defendant’s “financial 
condition” or “net wealth.”  See, e.g., California: California Jury Instructions, supra 
note 16, at 14.71 (“In arriving at any award of punitive damages, consider the following 
factors: . . . the amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the 
defendant in the [sic] light of the defendant’s financial condition.”); Florida: Florida 
Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, PD–1 6 (2004) (instructing the jury to consider 
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again invites the decisionmaker to disgorge profits earned from the 
entire scope of the misconduct. 
Many states insist that punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship 
to the actual and potential harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct.32  
 
the defendant’s “financial resources”); Indiana: Stroud v. Lints, 790 N.E.2d 440, 445 
(Ind. 2003) (“[I]f punitive damages are appropriate, the wealth of the defendant has for 
many years been held relevant to a determination of the appropriate amount.”). 
Several other states direct a reviewing court to consider the defendant’s “financial 
condition” or “wealth.”  See, e.g., Arkansas: Sauer, 111 S.W.3d at 358 (stating that 
when reviewing a punitive damage award, a court should consider “the financial and 
social condition and standing of the erring party”); Illinois: Hazelwood, 450 N.E.2d at 
1207 (holding that factors that the reviewing court should consider include “the financial 
status of the defendant”); Pennsylvania: Sprague, 656 A.2d at 927 (stating that in 
reviewing a punitive damage award, the trial court shall consider “the wealth of the 
defendant”). 
See also, e.g., Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 534 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(sustaining a $3.5 million punitive damage award, in part, because it was only five 
percent of the defendant’s total net worth); Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 925 P.2d 107, 
121 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (sustaining $4 million punitive damage award, in part, because 
it was only five percent of the defendant’s total net value), aff’d, 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 
1999); see also Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1147 (vacating trial court remittitur and re-instating 
$145 million punitive damage award, noting that the award was 0.26 of one percent of 
the defendant’s total net worth and that the defendant’s large financial worth merited a 
larger award); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259–60 (D. 
Kan. 2002) (holding “[t]he profitability that this court must consider is the gain realized 
by Reynolds from the course of conduct giving rise to plaintiff’s injuries” and measuring 
RJR’s profits based on sales of cigarettes to the entire public); Williams v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 839–40 (Ore. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that defendant’s misconduct was 
“highly profitable” based on evidence of defendant’s total net worth and its profits from 
all cigarette sales in 1996 and 1997). 
 32. At least six states expressly instruct the trier of fact to consider the relationship 
between the harm caused by the defendant and the amount of punitive damages.  Four of 
these states expressly instruct the trier of fact to consider both actual and potential harm.  
See, e.g., New York: N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil 2:278 (West, WESTLAW 
through NY PJI (updated Dec. 2003)):  
In arriving at your decision as to the amount of punitive damages you should 
consider the following factors: . . . 2. The actual and potential harm created by 
defendant’s conduct.  The amount of punitive damages that you award must be 
both reasonable and proportionate to the actual and potential harm suffered by 
the plaintiff, and to the compensatory damages you awarded the plaintiff. 
Virginia: Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 329, 338 (2002) (“[F]actors 
which are relevant to determining an appropriate measure of punitive damages: (a) 
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the 
harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that has actually 
occurred . . . .”). 
Fourteen additional states direct reviewing courts to consider the relationship between 
harm and punitive damages.  Eight of these states expressly direct reviewing courts to 
consider potential as well as actual harm.  See, e.g., Louisiana: In re New Orleans Train 
Car Leakage Fire Litig., 795 So. 2d 364, 386 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (“We also assess the 
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Others instruct the decisionmaker to consider factors such as the 
“magnitude of the harm,”33 “the extent and enormity of the harm,” or the 
“severity of the harm.”34  Factors such as these ostensibly serve as 
limiting factors, requiring the decisionmaker to set a punitive damage 
award with reference only to the transaction between the plaintiff before 
the court and the defendant.  Indeed, some courts have rejected defendants’ 
due process challenges on the grounds that these factors demonstrated 
that a punitive damage award did not punish a defendant for the entire 
scope of its misconduct but for only that misconduct directed at the 
plaintiff before the court.35  However, in practice these factors sometimes 
provide another opportunity for the punitive damage decisionmaker to 
set the damage award in reference to the total harm caused by the 
defendant’s misconduct.  Some states measure that harm not only as the 
harm to the injured party before the court, but also the harm to others.36  
Like using transactions with third parties as a measure of reprehensibility, 
such considerations also invite the punitive damage decisionmaker to 
impose sanctions on the entire scope of the defendant’s misconduct. 
 
quantum of punitive damages relative to, not only the actual harm that occurred, but also 
relative to the potential harm that could have occurred . . . .”), cert. denied, Nova Chems. 
Inc. v. Adams, 538 U.S. 944 (2003); Massachusetts: Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 
678 N.E.2d 853, 862 (Mass. 1997) (“In reviewing punitive damages, the judge may 
consider the following criteria: a reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely to 
occur from the defendant’s conduct as well as to the harm that actually has 
occurred . . . .”); Washington: State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257, 1263 (Wash. 1999) 
(following factor test of BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580–83 (1996), in 
which the Court compared the amount of the punitive award with the actual and potential 
harm caused by the defendant). 
 33. See, e.g., Alaska: Alaskan Vill., Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 949 (Alaska 1986). 
 34. See Colorado: Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. 1980). 
 35. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (D.N.J. 1989), 
modified on reconsideration, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989).  In Juzwin, the court 
conditionally struck an award of punitive damages, concluding that subjecting defendants 
to multiple punitive damage awards would deprive defendants of their right to 
fundamentally fair proceedings.  Id. at 1064.  On reconsideration, however, the court 
vacated its order striking punitive damage claims before it upon competent proof of 
previous awards.  Juzwin, 718 F. Supp. at 1236.  The court reiterated its holding that 
repetitive punitive damage awards violate due process.  Id. at 1234.  However, the court 
reasoned that multiple awards are not necessarily repetitive.  Id. at 1235.  In reaching this 
determination, the court noted, in part, that many states require courts to instruct juries 
that the amount of a punitive damage award must bear a reasonable relationship to 
compensatory damages.  Id.  The court reasoned that a jury rendering an award after 
such an instruction might not consider the full effect of the defendant’s conduct with 
respect to injured people other than the plaintiff.  Id.  Thus, the court concluded that a 
second award of punitive damages would not violate the due process clause if the first 
award was not intended by the jury to constitute “full” punishment for the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct.  Id. 
 36. See, e.g., Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) 
(noting in its discussion of ratio that “[i]t is thus appropriate to consider the effects of 
defendant’s actions on persons other than [the plaintiff] in determining the amount of 
punitive damages”), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 56 (2003), aff’d, 92 P.3d 126 (2004). 
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IV.  REFORMING REPREHENSIBILITY IN CAMPBELL 
As it had done in BMW v. Gore,37 the Court in Campbell sought to 
impose substantive limits on the size of individual punitive awards.38  
Although not addressing the propriety of total harm damages directly, 
Campbell attacked the reprehensibility factor as a method of reducing 
the size of individual awards.  In so doing, Campbell reformed the 
reprehensibility analysis.  Campbell prohibits the use of evidence of acts 
directed at parties other than the injured party before the court as a direct 
measure of reprehensibility.39  Instead, Campbell limits consideration of 
other act evidence to use solely as a measure of the defendant’s knowledge 
with respect to the transaction between the defendant and the plaintiff 
before the court.  This, in turn, limits the potential for total harm damages. 
In State Farm v. Campbell,40 the Court struck down a state court 
punitive damages award, concluding that it was grossly excessive under 
the guideposts the Court previously had announced in BMW v. Gore.  
Campbell, a State Farm insured, had been involved in a three-car auto 
accident in which the driver of one car was killed and the driver of 
another was seriously injured.  The estate of the deceased driver and the 
injured driver sued Campbell and offered to settle for an amount equal to 
the policy limits of the State Farm insurance policy covering Campbell. 
Even though the evidence strongly indicated that Campbell was at fault, 
State Farm refused to accept the settlement.41  State Farm also assured 
Campbell that he was likely to prevail at trial, that his personal assets 
were safe, and that he need not retain counsel.42  At trial, however, a jury 
awarded the two plaintiffs damages well in excess of the policy limits.43  
State Farm initially refused to pay the excess and informed Campbell 
that he would be personally liable for the judgment.  However, after 
Campbell’s appeal was denied, State Farm paid the entire judgment, 
including the amounts in excess of the policy limits.44 
 
 37. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559. 
 38. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 39. Id. at 410 (“Due process does not permit courts to adjudicate the merits of other 
parties’ hypothetical claims under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis.  Punishment 
on these bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same 
conduct, for nonparties are not normally bound by another plaintiff’s judgment.”). 
 40. Id. at 429. 
 41. See id. at 412–14. 
 42. Id. at 413. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 413–14. 
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Campbell and his wife instituted a claim against State Farm, alleging 
bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  At trial 
on the bad faith claim, a Utah jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million 
in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.45  The 
trial court reduced the awards to $1 million and $25 million respectively.46  
However, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive 
damage award.47  State Farm appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court contending that the punitive damage award was constitutionally 
excessive under BMW v. Gore. 
The United States Supreme Court found the $145 million punitive 
award unconstitutionally excessive.  The Court reasoned that the punitive 
damage award impermissibly attempted to punish State Farm for its 
nationwide claims adjustment policies.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court reiterated its holding in BMW v. Gore that a state may not impose 
punitive damages to punish extraterritorial conduct which was lawful 
where it occurred.48  The Court also expanded this holding, concluding 
that a state does not have a legitimate interest in imposing punitive 
damages to punish a defendant for extraterritorial conduct that was 
unlawful where it occurred.49  The Court noted that the Campbells introduced 
evidence regarding State Farm’s nationwide claims adjustment policy, 
including expert testimony regarding fraudulent practices under the 
policy and evidence concerning State Farm’s handling of first-party and 
non-auto insurance claims over the course of twenty years.50  Likewise, 
the Court noted that counsel for the Campbells argued that State Farm’s 
conduct toward the Campbells was part of a nationwide scheme to 
fraudulently keep claim pay outs low and increase profits.51  Finally, the 
Court noted that both the trial court and the Utah Supreme Court relied 
on State Farm’s nationwide policies in upholding the punitive damage 
award.52  Based on the lower courts’ opinions, the Court concluded that 
State Farm was being punished for this conduct in addition to its conduct 
directed toward the Campbells. 
The Campbells argued that the evidence of State Farm’s claim-
handling policies was relevant not as a basis for punitive damages 
themselves but, instead, as indicia of the degree of reprehensibility in 
State Farm’s dealings with the Campbells.  The Campbells argued that 
 
 45. Id. at 415. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 421. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 415. 
 51. Id. at 420. 
 52. Id. 
JANUTIS.DOC 8/21/2019  11:51 AM 
[VOL. 41:  1465, 2004]  Reforming Reprehensibility 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1479 
the evidence demonstrated State Farm’s motive in its treatment of them.  
The Campbells reasoned that tactics designed to underpay first-party 
claimants to increase State Farm’s profits were relevant to demonstrate 
that State Farm engaged in tactics designed to underpay third-party 
claimants for the same purpose—to increase profits.53  The Court 
rejected this role for extraterritorial conduct.  The Court noted, as it had 
in Gore, that extraterritorial conduct can be relevant to demonstrate 
deliberateness and culpability.54  However, the Court concluded that 
extraterritorial conduct must have a “nexus to the specific harm suffered 
by the plaintiff” to be relevant to deliberateness and culpability.55  
Further, the Court held that a jury had to be specifically instructed 
that it could not use punitive damages to punish lawful extraterritorial 
conduct.56  Here, the Court reasoned that evidence of State Farm’s 
nationwide claims adjustment policies was not related to its handling 
of third-party claims like the claims at issue in Campbell and, thus, 
not relevant to an assessment of State Farm’s reprehensibility.57  
Stripped of evidence of extraterritorial misconduct, the Court concluded 
that State Farm’s conduct toward the Campbells was not sufficiently 
reprehensible to warrant such a large punitive award.58 
Campbell is significant to reprehensibility analysis and to the 
viability of multiple punitive damage awards for three reasons.  First, 
in Campbell, the Court recognized for the first time that other 
misconduct evidence introduced ostensibly to demonstrate reprehensibility 
may be used to sanction the defendant directly for that other misconduct.  
As stated above, the Campbells introduced evidence regarding State 
Farm’s nationwide claims adjustment policy, including evidence 
concerning State Farm’s handling of first-party and non-auto insurance 
claims by other insureds.59  The Campbells contended that such 
evidence was relevant to establish the degree of reprehensibility of 
State Farm’s conduct directed at the Campbells.  However, the Court 
rejected the Campbells’ characterization, concluding that the Utah 
courts had used this measure of reprehensibility as a “guise” to punish 
 
 53. Id. at  421–24. 
 54. Id. at 422. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 423–24. 
 58. Id. at 419–20. 
 59. See id. at 414–15. 
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State Farm for its actions toward individuals other than the Campbells.60 
Second, in Campbell, the Court appears to have prohibited the use of 
evidence of the number of transactions with other parties as a direct 
measure of reprehensibility and, hence the use of reprehensibility to 
award total harm damages.  The Campbell Court expressly prohibited the 
use of evidence of unrelated transactions as a measure of reprehensibility.  
Further, the Court prohibited the use of unrelated transactions precisely 
because the Court concluded that unrelated transaction evidence was 
used as a means to impose punitive damages directly for that unrelated 
misconduct.  To this end, the Court held: “For a more fundamental reason, 
however, the Utah courts erred in relying upon [evidence of transactions 
with other parties]: The courts awarded punitive damages to punish and 
deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells’ harm.”61  Likewise, 
in explaining why State Farm’s conduct was insufficiently reprehensible 
to warrant the severe sanction imposed by the Utah courts, the Court 
noted: “The Campbells have identified scant evidence of repeated 
misconduct of the sort that injured them.  Nor does our review of the 
Utah courts’ decisions convince us that State Farm was only punished 
for its actions toward the Campbells.”62 
More importantly, this rationale would seem to prohibit the use of 
related misconduct as a direct measure of reprehensibility as well.  Some 
language in Campbell ostensibly leaves open the possibility of using 
evidence of related misconduct as a measure of reprehensibility.  For 
example, the Court acknowledge that “[l]awful out-of-state conduct may 
be probative” if it bears a “nexus to the specific harm suffered by the 
plaintiff.”63  Likewise, as noted above, in explaining why State Farm’s 
conduct was insufficiently reprehensible to warrant the severe sanction 
the Court noted not only that the Utah courts had punished State Farm 
for conduct directed at other parties but also that “[t]he Campbells have 
identified scant evidence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured 
them.”64  Finally, in explaining why the transaction between the 
Campbells and State Farm was the only conduct relevant to the 
 
 60. Id. at 422–23.  At oral argument one of the Justices remarked: 
   If you’ve done the same thing to other people, you can be punished more.  
Now, you may find a significant difference between punishing you for what 
you did to other people, and punishing you more for what you did to this 
person, because it is rendered more reprehensible because of what you did to 
other people, but I don’t see a whole lot of difference between the two. 
Oral argument transcript at 15, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408 (2003) (No. 01-1289) (Dec. 11, 2002). 
 61. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422. 
 62. Id. at 423. 
 63. Id. at 422. 
 64. Id. at 423. 
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reprehensibility analysis, the Court noted, “because the Campbells have 
shown no conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them, the 
conduct that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility 
analysis.”65  This language suggests that if the Campbells had offered evidence 
of State Farm misconduct in transactions with similarly situated third 
parties, such as evidence of misconduct by State Farm in its handling of 
third-party auto insurance claims, the Court would have considered these 
third-party transactions to be relevant measures of State Farm’s reprehensibility. 
If this is so, Campbell would do little to prevent the use of 
reprehensibility to award total harm damages in mass tort litigation.  The 
other misconduct evidence offered as a measure of reprehensibility in 
such actions is likely to be related to the misconduct directed at the 
injured plaintiff before the court.  For example, in Boeken the California trial 
court found Philip Morris’s conduct to be “utterly reprehensible” because 
“millions of American consumers” relied on the same misrepresentations 
that injured plaintiff before the court.66  Conduct directed at these absent 
consumers would seem to be related to the conduct that injured the 
plaintiff before the court in Boeken under any definition of relatedness 
because the exact same conduct was directed at the absent parties and the 
party before the court.67  Thus, courts could continue to use reprehensibility 
as a basis to sustain total harm damages. 
 
 65. Id. at 424. 
 66. Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., No. BC 226593, 2001 WL 1894403, at*3, *5 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001); see supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 67. Several courts have reached this conclusion post-Campbell.  See, e.g., Henley 
v. Philip Morris Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 71–72 (Ct. App. 2004): 
Defendant also substantially overstates this aspect of Campbell by suggesting 
that it rendered such evidence [of out-of-state conduct] categorically 
inadmissible.  On the contrary, the court acknowledged that such evidence may 
be considered if a sufficient ‘nexus’ is shown to the plaintiff’s claim. . . . 
Plaintiff’s claims, in contrast [to those in Campbell], rest on a quintessential 
‘mass tort,’ i.e., a course of more-or-less uniform conduct directed at the entire 
public and maliciously injuring, through a system of interconnected devices, an 
entire category of persons to which plaintiff squarely belongs. 
See also Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc., 76 P.3d 669, 674 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), modified on 
reconsideration, 76 P.3d 908 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (correcting punitive damages ratio): 
[The Campbell Court] did not say that out-of-state conduct [evidence] is per se 
irrelevant.  To the contrary, it stated that “evidence of repeated misconduct of 
the sort that injured” the plaintiff is entirely relevant.  In this case, there was 
evidence that [the defendant] engaged in nationwide misconduct in 
disseminating false and misleading information to the FDA and to physicians 
about [its product] and that the dissemination of that misleading information 
led to [plaintiffs’] damages. 
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However, a closer examination of Campbell reveals that the underlying 
premise would prohibit the use of both related and unrelated misconduct 
as measures of reprehensibility in and of themselves.  In rejecting the 
Utah courts’ reliance on evidence of unrelated transactions, the Court 
explained that the problem with the use of such evidence was that it was 
used as a vehicle to impose sanctions directly on those unrelated 
transactions.  The Court explained that due process prohibited a court from 
adjudicating and punishing hypothetical claims under the guise of 
reprehensibility.68  The Court continued: “Punishment on these bases creates 
the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same 
conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment 
some other plaintiff obtains.”69 
Likewise, in rejecting a state’s ability to sanction unlawful extraterritorial 
conduct, the Campbell Court explained: “Any proper adjudication of 
conduct that occurred outside Utah to other persons would require their 
inclusion, and, to those parties, the Utah courts, in the usual case, would 
need to apply the laws of their relevant jurisdiction.”70  This suggests 
that the Court’s concern with the use of unrelated misconduct evidence 
is not solely a concern with the extraterritorial nature of such evidence 
and, hence, its potential interference with state sovereignty71 or a 
concern that such evidence allows the defendant to be punished for its 
status as an “unsavory individual or business”72 rather than for the 
defendant’s bad acts themselves.  Instead, this suggests that the Court’s 
concern is that the use of unrelated misconduct evidence as a measure of 
reprehensibility may result in the defendant being punished for these 
unrelated acts directly and, hence, subject the defendant to the risk that it 
will be punished for these same acts again in a lawsuit brought by the 
victims of the unrelated acts.73 
 
 68. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 421–22 (emphasis added). 
 71. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (“We think it 
follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that a State may not 
impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the 
tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421. 
 72. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423. 
 73. But see Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 
YALE L.J. 347, 350 (2003).  Professor Sharkey argues that a “more contextualized and 
nuanced reading of [Campbell], however, suggests that the Court was primarily 
concerned with limiting the extraterritorial or out-of-state reach of punitive damages.”  
However, had the Court been concerned primarily with the extraterritorial reach of 
punitive damages, it would have had no need to raise its due process objection to the 
potential for multiple damages.  See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423.  The Court had already 
held that states could not impose punitive damages to punish lawful or unlawful 
extraterritorial conduct, id. at 421, and concluded that the Utah courts had impermissibly 
attempted to punish State Farm for its extraterritorial claims handling practices.  See id. 
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Use of evidence of related misconduct as much as use of unrelated 
misconduct would invite the jury to “adjudicate the merits of other 
parties’ hypothetical claims.”74  Thus, use of related misconduct evidence as 
a direct measure of reprehensibility would seem to expose the defendant 
to the same risk of multiple punitive damage awards which the Campbell 
Court sought to eliminate.  Indeed, the use of related misconduct as a 
direct measure of reprehensibility seems to have resulted in potentially 
duplicative awards in mass tort litigation.75 
Moreover, the Campbell Court’s overriding concern seemed to be not 
just that State Farm was punished for misconduct unrelated to the 
misconduct directed at the Campbells, but more generally that State 
Farm was punished for any conduct other than the conduct directed at 
the Campbells.  On several occasions in the opinion the Court noted its 
concern that the other misconduct evidence had resulted in sanctions 
imposed directly on that misconduct.  For example, in striking down the 
punitive award, the Court noted: “This case, instead, was used as a 
platform to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State 
Farm’s operations throughout the country.  The Utah Supreme Court’s opinion 
makes explicit that State Farm was being condemned for its nationwide 
policies rather than for the conduct directed toward the Campbells.”76  
Likewise, in assessing the reprehensibility of the award, the Court 
observed: “Nor does our review of the Utah courts’ decisions convince 
us that State Farm was only punished for its actions toward the 
Campbells.”77 
Even the Campbell Court’s discussion of the role of related misconduct 
suggests that the Court viewed a limited role for such evidence.  The 
Court seemed to reject the existence of related misconduct by itself as a 
measure of reprehensibility.  Instead, the Campbell Court seemed to 
suggest that related conduct directed at parties other than the plaintiff 
before the court is relevant only to assess the knowledge, intent, or 
deliberateness of the defendant with respect to its conduct toward the 
 
at 422.  Nonetheless, the Court continued its analysis, concluding that the Utah courts 
erred “[f]or a more fundamental reason.”  Id. at 422.  That reason being that the Utah 
courts imposed punitive damages to punish and deter conduct directed at parties other 
than the Campbells and that such a use of punitive damages created a risk of multiple 
punitive damage awards for the same conduct.  See id. at 422–23. 
 74. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422–23. 
 75. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 76. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 420. 
 77. Id. at 423. 
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particular plaintiff before the court.  Indeed, the Court so stated: “Lawful 
out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the 
deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action in the State 
where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a nexus to the specific 
harm suffered by the plaintiff.”78  Thus, Campbell appears to foreclose the 
use of related misconduct as a direct measure of reprehensibility.79 
At least one lower court has adopted this reading of Campbell.  In 
Wohlwend v. Edwards,80 the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that a 
plaintiff who was injured by a drunk driver could not admit evidence of 
the defendant’s driving while intoxicated on subsequent occasions.  The 
Wohlwend court recognized that the Campbell Court spoke of “dissimilar” 
acts.81  Likewise, the Wohlwend court acknowledged that the Campbell 
Court expressly recognized that repeated actions increased the 
reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct.82  The Wohlwend court noted 
that the defendant’s subsequent drunk driving convictions were similar 
to the conduct directed at the plaintiff before the court.  However, the 
court concluded that evidence of the subsequent convictions were not 
relevant to establish reprehensibility under Campbell because a jury 
might use this evidence to punish the defendant for the subsequent 
convictions directly, and as such, use of the evidence would subject the 
defendant to the risk of multiple punishment for the subsequent 
incidents.83  Further, in support of its reasoning, the court relied on cases 
 
 78. Id. at 422 (emphasis added).  The nexus requirement is consistent with the 
requirement in tort law that prior incidents must be sufficiently similar to prove 
knowledge of defect. 
 79. Such a reading is consistent with the Court’s discussion of related misconduct 
in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore.  The Court’s assessment of BMW’s reprehensibility in 
that case suggests that the Gore Court also viewed related misconduct as an indicium of 
the defendant’s culpability with respect to the conduct directed at the injured plaintiff 
before the court only.  In Gore, as in Campbell, the plaintiff argued that evidence of 
BMW’s failure to disclose minor repairs to other customers pursuant to the same 
nondisclosure policy at issue in Gore was relevant to establish reprehensibility.  BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 (1996).  The Court recognized that a defendant 
who “has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it 
was unlawful” could be subject to greater sanctions on the basis of their increased 
reprehensibility.  Id.  However, the Court concluded that evidence of these other 
transactions were not relevant to establish BMW’s increased reprehensibility.  Id.  In so 
doing, the Court noted that BMW reasonably could have believed that state disclosure 
statutes created a safe harbor and, thus, that its policy was lawful in other states.  Id. at 
577–79.  Likewise, the Court noted that BMW had not acted pursuant to its 
nondisclosure policy once the policy had been adjudged unlawful.  Id.  In this way, the 
Court’s reasoning focused solely on BMW’s knowledge at the time it engaged in the 
conduct.  This suggests that it is the defendant’s knowledge rather than the scope of its 
conduct that determines reprehensibility. 
 80. Wohlwend v. Edwards, 796 N.E.2d 781, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 786. 
 83. Id. at 787; see also id. at 789 (“In the present case, not only was there a 
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precluding evidence of subsequent similar conduct because such conduct 
could not establish the defendant’s state of mind at the time it committed 
the conduct directed at the plaintiff.84  Thus, the Wohlwend court implicitly 
recognized the limited role for related misconduct in establishing 
reprehensibility. 
Finally, the rationale underlying Campbell would appear to preclude 
use of transactions with absent parties as a measure of the other factors 
determining the size of punitive damages awards and, hence, preclude 
the use of other factors to impose total harm damages.  As discussed above, 
many states instruct the punitive damages decisionmakers to consider 
the profitability of the entire scope of the defendant’s misconduct in 
setting an award.85  Likewise, while insisting that punitive damages bear 
a reasonable relationship to the actual and potential harm caused by the 
defendant’s misconduct, some states measure that harm not only as the 
harm to the injured party before the court, but also the harm to others.86  
While Campbell does not directly address the propriety of inviting the 
jury to consider total profitability or total harm, the reasoning behind this 
decision again suggests that the Court would limit consideration of 
profitability to the profitability of the individual transaction between the 
defendant and the injured parties before the court.  Likewise, Campbell 
suggests that the Court would prohibit consideration of harm caused by 
transactions other than the transaction between the defendant and the 
injured parties before the court. 
As discussed above, Campbell recognized that although evidence of 
transactions with parties other than the injured parties before the court is 
put before punitive damage decisionmakers as a measure of reprehensibility, 
decisionmakers may use such evidence to punish the defendant for those 
other transactions directly.  When put before punitive damage decisionmakers 
as a measure of harm in relation to punitive damages, decisionmakers 
seem just as likely to use evidence of transactions with parties other than 
 
possibility that the jury based its award of punitive damages upon conduct other that than 
[sic] which damaged the plaintiff, it was a near certainty.  The jury was encouraged to do 
just that.”). 
 84. See id. at 787–88. 
 85. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Williams v. Philip 
Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (noting in its discussion of ratio that 
“[i]t is thus appropriate to consider the effects of defendant’s actions on persons other 
than [the plaintiff] in determining the amount of punitive damages”), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 
56 (2003), aff’d, 92 P.3d 126 (2004). 
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those before the court to punish the defendant for those transactions 
directly.  Likewise, inviting punitive damage decisionmakers to consider 
the profitability of an entire course of conduct invites decisionmakers to 
disgorge profits from the entire course of conduct.  Indeed, some courts 
have done so.87  However, such disgorgement is tantamount to a sanction 
imposed on the entire misconduct. 
In Campbell, the Court prohibited use of transactions with others as a 
measure of reprehensibility specifically because decisionmakers might 
punish the defendant for those transactions directly; consequently, the 
defendant would be subject to the risk of duplicative punishment for 
those other transactions in subsequent actions brought by those absent 
parties who were injured in the other transactions.  Because punitive 
damages decisionmakers may use evidence of other transactions offered 
as measures of harm or profitability to punish those other transactions 
directly, the defendant, likewise, will be subject to the risk of duplicative 
punishment for those other transactions in subsequent actions brought by 
the absent parties who were injured in those other transactions.  Thus, 
the reasoning of Campbell would seem to preclude use of evidence of 
other transactions as a measure of profitability of the defendant’s 
misconduct or as a measure of harm in relation to punitive damages. 
Indeed, while Campbell does not expressly prohibit the use of harm or 
potential harm to others in evaluating the relationship between actual 
harm and punitive damages, the Court has defined harm in terms of 
harm to the individual plaintiff.88  Thus, after Gore and Campbell, it is 
likely that states must limit consideration of harm to that suffered by the 
individuals before the court.89 
Moreover, while the Court has not placed restrictions on the use of 
evidence of other transactions to measure profitability expressly, the 
Court has expressed concerns about the use of net wealth as an award 
 
 87. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 88. At least one lower court has expressly prohibited courts and juries from 
considering harm to others as a measure of actual harm.  See Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 
F.3d 648, 659–60 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 89. The actual harm caused by the defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff might 
more accurately describe the appropriate measure of actual harm.  Such a measure would 
take account of unrecoverable externalities resulting from the defendant’s misconduct.  
As such, this measure would be more consistent with the original purpose of punitive 
damages.  It would also be consistent with the Court’s view of the role of punitive 
damages.  In Campbell, the Court notes that State Farm’s conduct towards the Campbells 
deserves a more modest sanction, in part, because all of the Campbells’ harm has been 
recouped through compensatory damages, and thus, punitive damages would be 
duplicative.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003).  
This suggests that the Court views the role of punitive damages, in part, as a measure to 
compensate victims for otherwise unrecoverable harms. 
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enhancer.90  Further, at least one lower court has interpreted Campbell to 
prohibit use of evidence of other transactions as a measure of profitability 
and to limit the decisionmaker’s ability to disgorge profits from the other 
transactions.  In Romo v. Ford Motor Co.,91 a California appellate court 
concluded that Campbell constitutionalized a “narrow view” of the goal 
and measure of punitive damages which limited a state’s legitimate 
interest in imposing punitive damages to punishing only that conduct 
which injured the plaintiff before the court and prohibited a state from 
punishing a defendant for “everything else it may have done wrong.”92  
As such, the Romo court concluded, in part, that a jury instruction 
directing the jury to consider “the amount of punitive damages which 
will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in light of defendant’s 
financial condition” and argument of counsel that the jury should award 
punitive damages based on the profit the defendant made on the sale of 
all the same model defective product impermissibly “fail[ed] to restrict 
the jury to punishment and deterrence based solely on the harm to the 
plaintiffs.”93 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I view this reformation of reprehensibility and potentially other 
aspects of the procedures for awarding punitive damages favorably for 
two reasons.  While I am not certain that this reformation of reprehensibility 
is the best solution to total harm damages, it is a solution which may 
eliminate the practice of awarding total harm punitive damages in mass 
tort litigation.  This, in turn, may ensure the continued viability of 
punitive damage claims in mass tort litigation.94  First, it may ensure the 
viability of punitive damage claims by reducing the theoretical appeal of 
 
 90. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) (“The fact that 
BMW is a large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not diminish its 
entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on the conduct of 
its business.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 427 (“The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an 
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.”). 
 91. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 801–02 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 92. Id. at 802. 
 93. Id. at 805. 
 94. As other commentators have recognized, awarding punitive damages to 
multiple injured parties furthers interests in retribution and compensation underlying 
punitive damages.  See, e.g., Owen, supra note 6; see also Anthony J. Sebok, What Did 
Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters 
Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 181 (2003) (arguing that punitive damages, in part, 
compensate the injured plaintiff for her hurt feelings). 
JANUTIS.DOC 8/21/2019  11:51 AM 
 
1488 
defendants’ claims of duplicative punishment.  Second, on a practical 
level, this reformation may reduce the size of punitive damage awards to 
current claimants, and thereby increase the pool of assets available to 
future claimants.95  Limiting the consideration of other act evidence to 
consideration as a measure of the defendant’s knowledge only should 
reduce the scope of other act evidence presented to punitive damage 
decisionmakers.  As a practical matter, this could reduce the number of 
related transactions presented to decisionmakers.  For example, while 
evidence of transactions occurring prior to the transaction may be 
relevant to a defendant’s knowledge, as Wohlwend demonstrates, conduct 
subsequent to the transaction with the plaintiff would not bear on the 
defendant’s knowledge at the time of the transaction with the plaintiff.96  
Further, only prior transactions in which the defendant became aware of 
harm to the injured party would be relevant to demonstrate knowledge.  
To the extent that punitive damage decisionmakers do impose punitive 
damages to sanction these other acts directly, reducing the number of 
other acts that the decisionmakers consider should reduce the size of 
punitive awards. 
I also find the Court’s reformation of reprehensibility appealing because 
it brings the process for awarding punitive damages more in line with the 
retributivist principles which justify consideration of reprehensibility as 
a measure for assessing punitive damages in the first instance.  In 
explaining the relevance of reprehensibility, the Gore Court relied on 
what it perceived to be the well accepted retributivist principle of 
reciprocity.  The Court observed: 
As the Court stated nearly 150 years ago, exemplary damages imposed on a 
defendant should reflect “the enormity of his offense.”  This principle reflects 
 
 95. Admittedly, on this front some empirical research suggests that Gore may not 
have been successful.  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The 
Predictability of Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW 
v. Gore on Punitive Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be 
Reduced, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 59 (1999).  Eisenberg and Wells report an increase in 
mean punitive damage awards after Gore.  However, they also report an increase in 
compensatory awards and a statistically significant decrease in the ratio between punitive 
and compensatory damages.  Id. at 76. Whether Gore has had any sizeable effect on 
punitive damages since 1999 remains to be measured.  To this end, Eisenberg and Wells 
noted that at the time that they conducted their research insufficient time might have 
elapsed for Gore to have exercised significant influence on the pattern of punitive 
awards.  Id. at 61.  Moreover, the effects of Campbell, of course, cannot be known at this 
time. 
 96. See, e.g., Wohlwend v. Edwards, 796 N.E.2d 781, 787–88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); 
see also Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439, 451 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating 
that post-design evidence does not evince defendant’s contemporaneous consciousness 
of wrongdoing); Fullmer v. Tague, 500 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1993) (discussing that 
evidence of similar conduct postdating the conduct giving rise to the litigation was not 
relevant to show a pattern of wrongful conduct). 
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the accepted view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others. . . .  In 
TXO, both the West Virginia Supreme Court and the Justices of this Court 
placed special emphasis on the principle that punitive damages may not be 
“grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense.”97 
Reciprocity is integral to a retributivist model of criminal punishment.  
Stated simply, reciprocity provides that the punishment should fit the 
crime.  Retributivist theorists and limited retributivist theorists have explained 
that reciprocity demands that the punishment be measured by the 
seriousness of the crime and that the seriousness be measured from a 
social point of view, not solely from the perspective of what would be 
required to make the injured party whole.98  In measuring the seriousness 
of the crime from a social perspective, retributivist theorists measure not 
only the harm to the victim, but also the seriousness of the right invasion 
involved.99  Finally, retributivist theorists take into account the culpability 
of the offender based on his or her state of mind.100 
Reprehensibility as reformed by the Court better comports with this 
model.  The Court demands that punitive damages bear a reasonable 
relationship to the harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct.  Thus, the 
Court takes into account the harm to the victim in measuring a reciprocal 
sanction.  The reprehensibility analysis then performs the dual function 
of measuring the seriousness of the right invasion and accounting for the 
defendant’s culpability.  The seriousness of the right invasion stems not 
from the fact that the defendant has engaged in similar invasions of 
rights but rather from the nature of the right itself.  This comports with 
the retributivist ideal that punishment be for the bad act rather than for 
the defendant’s status as a bad actor.  Thus, in both Campbell and Gore, 
the Court emphasizes aggravating factors like the use of trickery or 
deceit or the vulnerability of the victim and ranks misconduct resulting 
in physical harm as more serious than invasions of economic interests.101  
 
 97. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996) (citations 
omitted). 
 98. Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059, 
1081–83, 1088–92 (1992). 
 99. Id. at 1081–83, 1094–95. 
 100. Id. at 1088–92. 
 101. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); 
Gore, 517 U.S. at 576–77; see also Jane Mallor & Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages: 
On the Path to a Principled Approach?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1009 (1999) (“The 
[Gore] Court provided a brief taxonomy of reprehensibility and indicated that the 
amount of a punitive award should be in proportion to both the wrongfulness of the 
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s interest that the conduct implicated.”). 
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Additionally, the Court emphasized the mental state of the defendant, 
demanding full reciprocity when the defendant knowingly engaged in 




 102. Gore, 517 U.S. at 576. 
